(Opinion)
First, the big picture:
Romania’s biggest effort in 2025 is to lower the budget deficit by 1.8% of GDP as key sectors of the economy are grounded, but it will be a purely technical matter: no one would have questioned 5-10 years ago that the energy needed to advance and sophisticate the economy would be spent at some point to keep on the table Romania’s model of society and Western alliances.
Now we have to review the subject of Western market capitalism, and the first results of this test that has just begun are as follows:
1, On December 23, Ciolacu government was voted by the Parliament with only 7 votes difference, even if it had the support of the two mainstream parties, the hungarian party and the group of minorities.
This means – leaving aside the small USR group – that in addition to the 35% that represents the chairs of AUR-SOS-POT (i.e. Simion-Georgescu-Șoșoaca), the anti-Western part of social-democrats (PSD) is larger than one might suspect. A mere whiff of wind in the party will blow all government support in the other direction.
2, The configuration of party groups across the main state institutions shows that both sides – pro- and anti-Western, have negotiated their positions and are preparing for the next assaults.
3, We are still missing the major player of foreign policy and of managing the domestic political balance: the president of the country – the head of state and the one whose sword thrown in one talger or another can tip the scales one way or the other. This at a time when the negotiations on Ukraine and the Black Sea area are in full swing – the US-Russia back-and-forth we see on TV is just what is heard through the walls when voices are raised. But the important things are whispered.
The three points are forming Romania’s macro situation at a time when Russia is negotiating the rift between Europe and Asia and needs chaos, lack of intransigence, friendly politicians and treacherous secret services in Bucharest.
And now the details of the picture, which we call „The Georgescu Phenomenon” in 7 details. We’ll start with the 7th, to leave the most relevant artist’s touch at the end:
7, Călin Georgescu could have been eliminated from the electoral race by the AEP (Permanent Election Authority) simply and according to he law: he had listed „zero costs” in the funding of his electoral campaign, although it was clear even if only on social networks that there were costs, really high costs.
The funding of an election campaign is a HUGE ISSUE in any democracy – we can see this from the scandals we see in Western democracies, where Sarkozy was convicted for a few hundred thousand euros, where the great Kohl lost the CDU leadership after a similar scandal – to give just two examples. This is because elections must not be influenced by mega-campaigns financed by hostile states – in Romania, Germany, the UK, the US, etc.: the scandals we see everywhere are precisely because of the huge danger posed by non-transparent funding.
But Călin Georgescu has not been removed from the game based on the law he broke, and Toni Greblă should be held accountable for that.
6, Călin Georgescu’s electoral campaign was funded with Romanian money, produced by a few businessmen with eastern sympathies, with issues in competing on domestic and international markets and, above all, wired by economic interests to the business ecosystem that Romanian secret services have developed over the last two decades.
All the European and security studies I have read show that countries hostile to the EU states do not work with their own money if they are able to find local businessmen dissatisfied with the European market or breaches in the systems of local secret services. In Romania these breaches are much easier to spot – one can simply enter through the business ecosystem that the secret services have developed.
The funding of Călin Georgescu’s electoral campaign by Romanian businessmen, as well as the money’s trail are currently in Fiscal Agency’s court and it is very likely that we will see the first results (and names) before the start of the electoral campaign.
With one amendment: it is quite possible that we will not find out everything, but only the names of some losers, and with the others there will be „negotiations”: either with them, or direct negotiations between the services that each of them has behind them.
5, The marketing directors of big companies value Călin Georgescu’s TikTok campaign only at a minimum of 30 million and a maximum of 60 million. Euros.
4, Călin Georgescu’s campaign on TikTok shows professionalism and, above all, a supra-national strategy and vision, typical of a „state actor” – let us NOT suspect our secret services involved in one form or another in Călin Georgescu’s campaign of excessive professionalism:
the development of the communication infrastructure years in advance, the fragmentation, the targeting and micro-targeting, detection of messages for hundreds of human profiles, rolling the campaign while wiping the traces, etc.
This can be seen if only from the documents declassified by CSAT (Country Supreme Defence Council) – few, vague and too general compared to the „real” detailed reports, which give names and surnames, concrete actions and responsibilities.
3, Călin Georgescu’s campaign and, above all, its spectacular outcome was done with the complicity of Romanian secret services: it’s impossible to believe that the SRI (Romanian Intel Service) could not assess or anticipate the devastating amplitude of the mobilization on social networks for Călin Georgescu, or the SIE’s ability to timely assess the external involvement of Russia either direct or by proxy, or the STS (Special Telecom Service) – which not even in the CSAT meeting did say how many attacks on the infrastructure took place – or the others, the Army intel service or the „two-and-a-half” unit or… The dozens of business groups into which these security entities have „broken” have obstructed the visibility towards their sole raison d’être – to protect Romania as a democratic, European and Euro-Atlantic state – and have hijacked the wish of a democratic Romania in the Western sense, towards the meaning that democracy has in states like Hungary, or even Turkey.
2, All this betrayal – direct, or through negligence or incompetence – of the Romanian secret services took place against the backdrop of the external assault on the Romanian elections:
the mechanism is very similar to what happened in the Republic of Moldova, where the pro-European referendum and Maia Sandu „narrowly” passed through the rain of Russian propaganda – a mechanism supported from the shadows by great Russia-lovers such as the fugitive Plahotniuc. The manipulation in Romania was not only professionally done, but also gave the impression that the mechanism had been oiled and honed long before in other actions as well: they just brought the „installation” – they set it on the nationalist, legionary and sovereign propaganda cultivated for years and on the popular anger stemming from the corruption of the political class – they plugged it in and went for a beer. They knew it could not fail.
1, All of the above was Romania’s contribution to the Georgescu phenomenon (without commas) – which scared electoral Europe. This is because the big enemy behind the hijacking of the Romanian presidential elections is Russia.
It is quite dangerous not to correctly and fully assess Russia’s role in the failed putsch in Bucharest. Yes, we all want evidence, especially as it must explain a measure as desperate and radical as the CCR’s (Constitutional Court) decision to annul the elections. But let’s not forget that we are in the middle of a real war (without a military component), and we are deluding ourselves if we don’t see that in such situations things work differently – evidence has become a weapon on the arms market in internal wars or in relations with external allies – before showing the amateurism and betrayal of some structures in Bucharest, what we have seen shows spectacular results achieved through technology, professionalism and, to the highest degree, pure Science.
If we see evidence, it will be punctual, well-targeted, delivered in a very precise way and only with a very precise purpose: not only to eliminate Călin Gorgescu and the secret service structures fighting for him from the game, but also, after the elections, in the wars between factions composed of secret services, politicians and businessmen.
But that’s if the elections are won by a pro-Western president – and maybe not even then, because this „civil war” may not be seen in public and the executions may be done quietly. Until then, the game is still ongoing – we see the aggressiveness and self-assurance with which Călin Georgescu and Victor Ponta trot on stage.
Personally, there is no doubt in my mind that the elections in Romania have scared – literally – the West, and that Russia’s actions in Bucharest are a textbook case for politicians and intelligence services in the Western democratic states.
At this time of geopolitical adjustments on the fault line between the EU and Asia, the most serious thing is that we do not have the foreign policy incumbent in place – in a year when foreign policy is defeating domestic policy – and Romania is under immense pressure to steer towards the East.
And there is also under another kind of pressure:
The pressing need to find out at least a relevant and convincing part of those truths that led to the CCR decision to annul the elections.
This is because that decision set such a violent precedent and shook the LAWS OF DEMOCRACY in Romania so badly that, with a political class created by counter-selection and under the governance of security structures, we should never find ourselves in the situation where any behind-the-scenes war requires an exceptional electoral decision.
But we will know more about all this after the elections. Only after the elections.
PS:
One detail, on the observation of a reader, who writes to me that the Russian „installation” did not work in the parliamentary elections, which are more importantly the presidential:
this theory appeared a few weeks ago in the German newspaper FAZ, in an article written by the paper’s Vienna correspondent. But the theory is false: the fact that AUR, SOS and POT got 35% in parliament is negligible? Or does the fact that 2 mainstream parties + UDMR + miniorities managed to pass the government with a difference of only 7 (seven) votes (i.e. if the pro-Eastern wing of PSD can very simply tip the balance towards Russia) means that Russia did not get a good result in the parliamentary elections?
***
Urmărește-ne pe Google News
